ΔΗΜΟΣΘΕΝΗΣ

ΚΑΤΑ ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΥ Α´

ΑΡΧΑΙΟ ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΤΑΦΡΑΣΗ ΣΤΑ ΑΓΓΛΙΚΑ
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Κατά Φιλίππου Α’

ei μὲν περὶ κανονὶ τινὸς πράγματος προτίθετ’, ὅ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, λέγειν, ἐπισχῦν ἃν ἄς οἱ πλεῖοτοι τῶν εἰσοδῶν γνώμην ἀπεφήναντο, εἰ μὲν ἣρεσι κεὶ τι μοι τῶν ὑπὸ τούτων ὑπεύξων, ἤπιοι ποτὲ ἂν ἤδην, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τότ’ ἂν καύτως ἐπειφῶμην ἐν γεγνώσκω λέγειν· ἐπειδή δ’ ὑπὲρ ἂν πολλάκις εἰφήκασιν οὐτοὶ πρότερον συμβαίνει, καὶ νυνι σκοτείν, ἤγουμαι καὶ πρῶτος ἀναστάσις εἰκότως ἂν συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν, εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρεληφθότος χρόνου τὰ δέονθ’ οὕτως συνεβούλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἄν υμᾶς νῦν ἐδει βουλεύεσθαι. [2] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀδυμητέου, ὅ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασιν, οὔδ’ εἰ πάνυ φαύλας ἔχειν δοκεῖ, ὅ γὰρ ἐστὶ χειριστὸν αὐτῶν ἐκ τοῦ παρεληφθότος χρόνου, τούτῳ πρὸ τὰ μέλλοντα βέλτιστον υπάρχει, τὶ οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο; ὅτι οὐδέν, ὅ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν δεόντων ποιοῦντων ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματ’ ἔχειν· ἐπεὶ τοι, εἰ πάνθ’ ἄ προσήκη πραττόντων οὕτως εἰχέν, οὔδ’ ἄν ἔλπις ἂν αὐτὰ βέλτιω γενέσθαι. [3] ἐπειτ’ ἐνθυμητέον καὶ παρ’ ἄλλων ἄκουσαν καὶ τοῖς εἰδόντων αὐτοῖς ἀναμμηνησκομένοις, ἥλικην ποτ’ ἐχόντων δύναμιν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἐξ οὗ χρόνος οὐ πολίς, ὡς καλὸς καὶ προσηκοντός οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον υμῖς ἐπράξατε τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλ’ ὑπεμείναθ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαιῶν τὸν πρὸς ἐκείνους πόλεμον. τίνος οὖν εἴνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· ἵν’ ἰδῆτ’, ὅ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ θέασθε, ὅτι οὐδὲν οὔτε φυλαττομένος υμῖν ἐστίν φοβηρὸν, οὔτ’ ἂν ὁλιγορῆτε, τοιοῦτον οἰκὸν ἄν υμεῖς βουλεύσατε, παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τῇ τότε ὡμίῃ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἢς ἐκκαταστάτ’ ἐκ τοῦ προσέχειν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νόστον, καὶ τῇ νῦν ἄρτη κατατοῦν, δι’ ἄν

First Philippic

If the question before us were a new one, men of Athens, I should have waited until most of the regular speakers had delivered their opinions, and if satisfied with any of their proposals, I should have remained silent, but if not satisfied, I should then have tried to express my own views. Since, however, it is our fortune to be still debating a point on which they have often spoken before, I can safely claim your indulgence if I am the first to rise and address you. For if in the past their advice had been sound, there would be no need for deliberation today. [2] Now in the first place, Athenians, there is no need to despair of our present position, however hopeless it may seem. For that which is worst in the days that are past and gone is just what affords the best assurance for the future. And what is that? It is that your affairs are in this evil plight just because you, men of Athens, utterly fail to do your duty; since surely, were you so placed in spite of every effort on your part, it would be hopeless to look for improvement. [3] In the next place, bear this in mind. Some of you have been told, others know and remember, how formidable the Spartans were, not many years ago, and yet how at the call of honor and duty you played a part not unworthy of your country, and entered the lists against them in defence of your rights. I remind you of this, Athenians, because I want you to know and realize that, as no danger can assail you while you are on your guard, so if you remiss no success can attend you. Learn a lesson from the former strength of the Lacedaemonians, which you mastered by strict attention to your affairs, and the present arrogance of our enemy,
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ταραττόμεθ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ μηδὲν φροντίζειν ὑπὸ ἔχοντι. [4] εἰ δὲ τὶς υμῶν, ὡς ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναίοι, δυσπολέμητον οίκεται τὸν Φίλιππον εἶναι, σκοπόν τὸ τε πλήθος τῆς ύπαρχούσης αὐτῶς δυνάμεως καί τὸ τὰ χωρία πάντ᾽ ἀπολαλέναι τῇ πόλει, ὡς, μὲν εἶπε, λογισάσθω μέντοι τοῦ ἀνδρεί, ὧν εἴχομεν ποιθ᾽ ἡμεῖς, ὡς ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναίοι, Πύδναν καὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ Μεθώνιαν καί πάντα τὸν τότον τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μετ᾽ ἐκείνου νῦν ὄντων ἐθνῶν αὐτονομούμενα καλεῖντες ψήνηχε, καί μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ἐβούλετ᾽ ἔχειν οἰκείως ᾃ κείνῳ. [5] εἰ τοῖς οἷς ο Φίλιππος τότε ταύτῃ ἡγεῖται ἡγεῖται τὴν γνώμην, ὡς χαλεπὸν πολεμεῖν ἐστὶν Ἀθηναίους ἠχουσι τοσοῦτον ἐπιπειδεύσατα τῆς αὐτοῦ χωρᾶς ἔρημον οὖν συμμάχους, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑπὸ ποιήσατο ἐπιρραξάν οὐδὲ τοσοῦτον ἐκτίθησαν ἂν ὑπὲραμ. ἀλλ᾽ εἰδεν, ὡς ἀνδρείς Ἀθηναίοι, τότε καλῶς ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι ταύτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἀπαντὰ τὰ χωρὶ ἀθλα τοῦ πολέμου κείμεν ἐν μέσῳ, φύσει δ᾽ ὑπάρχει τοῖς παροῦσα τὰ τῶν ἀπόντων, καὶ τοῖς ἐθέλουσι ποιεῖν καὶ κινδυνεύειν τὰ τῶν ἀμελεύσων. [6] καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ταύτῃ χρησιμόνους τὴ γνώμη πάντα κατέστραπται καὶ ἔχει, τὰ μὲν ὡς ἂν ἐλῶν τις ἄχους πολέμῳ, τὰ δὲ σύμμαχοι πρὸς ποιησάμενος- καὶ γὰρ συμμαχεῖν καὶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις ἐθέλουσιν ἀπάντηταν, ὡς ἂν ὡς χαλεποκεφαλεμένοις καὶ πράττειν ἐθέλοντας ἂ χρή. [7] ἂν τοίνυν, ὡς ἀνδρείς Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ υμεῖς ἂν τοῖς τουτουσ ἐθέλησατε γενέσθαι γνώμης νῦν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ πρότερον, καὶ ἐκατός υμῶν, οὐ δει καὶ δύναι ἂν παρασχεῖν αὐτῶν χρησίμον τῇ πόλει, πάσαν αἱρέσιν τὴ εἰρωνείαν ἐτοιμοῦ πράττειν ὑπάρχη, ὃ μὲν χρήματ᾽ ἐχον εἰσφέρειν, ὃ δ᾽ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ στρατεύεσθαι, — συνελοῦσι δ᾽ ἀπλῶς ἂν υμῶν αὐτῶν ἐθελήσατε γενέσθαι, καὶ παύσασθο ἂν δ᾽ αὐτῶς μὲν υιοῦ ἐκατός ποιήσειν ἐλπίζων, τὸν δὲ πλησίον πάνθ᾽ which discomposes us because we ignore every call of duty. [4] But if anyone here, Athenians, is inclined to think Philip too formidable, having regard to the extent of his existing resources and to our loss of all our strongholds, he is indeed right, yet he must reflect that we too, men of Athens, once held Pydna, Potidaea, and Methone and had in our own hands all the surrounding territory, and that many of the native tribes now in his service were then free and independent and were indeed more inclined to side with us than with Philip. [5] If, therefore, Philip had then come to the conclusion that it was a difficult task to fight the Athenians while they held such strong outposts in his own territory and he was destitute of allies, in that case he would never have gained his present successes, never acquired his present power. But, men of Athens, Philip saw clearly that all these outposts were but the open prizes of war, that by natural right the property of the absent belongs to those who are on the spot, and the property of the careless to those who can face toil and danger. [6] It was precisely by acting on this principle that he has mastered and now holds them all. Some he has seized by right of arms, others he has won by alliance and friendship. For indeed alliance and respect are willingly offered by all men to those whom they see ready and prompt to take action. [7] And you too, men of Athens, if you are willing to adopt this principle, now if never before, if each citizen is ready to throw off his diffidence and serve the state as he ought and as he best may, the rich man paying, the strong man fighting, if, briefly and plainly, you will consent to become your own masters, and if each man will cease to expect that, while he does nothing himself, his neighbor will do
everything for him, then, God willing, you will recover your own, you will restore what has been frittered away, and you will turn the tables upon Philip. [8] Do not believe that his present power is fixed and unchangeable like that of a god. No, men of Athens; he is a mark for the hatred and fear and envy of those who now seem devoted to him. One must assume that even his adherents are subject to the same passions as any other men. At present, however, all these feelings are repressed and have no outlet, thanks to your indolence and apathy, which I urge you to throw off at once. [9] For observe, Athenians, the height to which the fellow's insolence has soared; he leaves you no choice of action or inaction; he blusters and talks big, according to all accounts; he cannot rest content with what he has conquered; he is always taking in more, everywhere casting his net round us, while we sit idle and do nothing. [10] When, Athenians, will you take the necessary action? What are you waiting for? Until you are compelled, I presume. But what are we to think of what is happening now? For my own part I think that for a free people there can be no greater compulsion than shame for their position. Or tell me, are you content to run round and ask another one, “Is there any news today?” Could there be any news more startling than that a Macedonian is triumphing over Athenians and settling the destiny of Hellas? [11] “Is Philip dead?” you ask. “No, indeed; but he is ill.” And what is that to you? Even if something happens to him, you will soon raise up a second Philip, if that is the way you attend to your affairs; for even this Philip has not grown great power through his own unaided strength so much as through our carelessness. [12] Nor is this all. If anything happened to him, or if Fortune, which always cares for us better than
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επιμελούμεθα, καὶ τοὺτο ἐξεργάσατο, ἵσθι ὅτι πλησίον μὲν ὄντες, ἀπασιν ἀν τοῖς πράγμασιν τεταραγμένοις ἐπιστάντες ὡς ἐνδεχόμενοι ὅπως διοικήσαισθε, ὡς ἰδίοντον τῶν καρπῶν Ἀμφιτολίῳ δέξασθαι δύνασθο ἀν, ἀποτιθεμένοι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς καὶ ταῖς γνώμαις. [13] ἦσαν οὖν δὲ τὰ προσκόμια ποιεῖν ἐθέλουντες ὑπάρχειν ἀπαντάς ἐτοίμως, ὡς ἐγκυκλίως ὑμῶν καὶ πεπεισμένοις, παυόμει λέγον· τὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς παρασκευῆς ἴνα ἀπαλλάξαται ἀν τῶν τοιούτων πραγμάτων ὑμᾶς οἴσκαι, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὅσον, καὶ πόρους οὕστως χρησάτως, καὶ τάλλῳ ὡς ἀν μοι βέλτιστα καὶ τάχιστα δοκεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι, καὶ δὴ πεισάσθωμεν λέγειν, δεηθές ὑμῶν, ὠ, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τοσοῦτον. [14] ἐπειδὴ ἀπαντ' ἀκούσθη πρότεινε, μὴ πρότερον προλαμβάνετε· μὴδ' ἄν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δοκῶ τοις καίνην παρασκευὴν λέγειν, ἀναβάλλειν μὲ τὰ πράγματ' ἠγείρον. οὐ γὰρ οἱ 'ταχὺ καὶ 'τίμερον εἰπόντες μάλιστ' εἰς δέον λέγουσιν (οὐ γὰρ ἤν τὰ γ' ἤδη γεγενημένα τῇ νυνὶ βοθείαι καλύσαι δυνηθείμεν") [15] ἀλλ' ὡς ἄν δεῖξῃ τις πορισθείς παρασκευῇ καὶ πόσῃ καὶ πόθεν διαμείζεται δυνήσαται, ἐὼς ἄν ἡ διαλυσώμεθα πειθόντες τὸν πόλεμον ἦ περιγενέμεθα τῶν ἐχθρῶν· οὔτω γὰρ οὐκετί τοῦ λοιποῦ πάσχοιμεν ἃν κακῶς. οίμαι τοῖνοι ἐγὼ ταύτα λέγειν ἐχέω, μὴ καλῶν εἰ τὰς ἀλλος ἐπαγγέλλεται τι· ἢ μὲν ὄν ὑπόσχεσιν οὕτω μεγαλῆ, τὸ δὲ φραγμ' ἤδη τὸν ἐλεγχόν δώσει· κρίται δ' ὑμεῖς ἐπεσθε. [16] πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνοι, ὠ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τρίφες πεντήκοντα παρασκευάσασθαι φημὶ δειν, εἰτ' αὐτοὺς οὕτω τὰς γνώμας ἔχειν ὡς, ἐὰν τι δέερ, πλευστόν εἰς ταύτας αὐτοὺς ἐμβάινω. πρὸς δὲ τούτως τοῖς ἡμᾶςσεν τῶν ἱππεῶν ἰππαγωγοὺς τρίφες καὶ πλοῖ we care for ourselves, should bring that result about, remember that you must be on the spot if you want to take advantage of the general confusion and to control the situation at your pleasure; but in your present condition you would be unable, even if the opportunity offered, to take over Amphipolis, having neither a force nor a policy ready to hand. [13] Well, assuming that you are thoroughly convinced that you must all be ready and willing to make this necessary effort, I say no more on that point. But as to the nature and size of the force which I think adequate to relieve the situation, the means of defraying the cost, and the best and speediest method of providing for its equipment, I shall now endeavor to state my views, making just this appeal to you, Athenians. [14] Wait till you have heard everything before you pass judgment. Do not be premature; and even if at the outset I seem to be suggesting a novel kind of expeditionary force, do not imagine that I am trying to postpone our operations. It is not those who cry “at once” or “today” that really speak to the purpose, for no dispatch of forces now could prevent what has already happened; [15] but it is the man who can indicate the nature, the size, and the source of the expedition that will be able to keep the field until we either defeat the enemy or consent to a termination of hostilities; for that is how we shall avoid trouble in the future. Now I believe that I can indicate this, without prejudice to anyone else’s proposal. That is a bold promise, but it will soon be put to a practical test, and you shall be my judges. [16] First then, men of Athens, I propose to equip fifty war-galleys; next you must make up your minds to embark and sail in them yourselves, if necessary. Further I recommend the provision of transports and other vessels,
Ικανά ευτρεπίσαι κελεύω. [17] ταύτα μὲν οίμαι δεῖν ύπάρχειν ἐπὶ τάς ἐξαιρετικῶς ταύτας ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας χώρας αὐτοῦ στρατείας εἰς Πύλας καὶ Χερσόνησον καὶ Ὄλυμπον καὶ ὅποι βουλεύτων· δει γὰρ ἐκείνω τούτῳ ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ παραστῆσαι, ὡς ύμεις ἐκ τῆς ἀμελείας ταύτης τῆς ἁγίας, ἀστέρει εἰς Εὐβοίαν καὶ πρὸτερον ποτὲ φασιν εἰς Ἀλίαρτον καὶ τὰ τελευταία προών εἰς Πύλας, ἵστασιν ὁ ὑμείσαι—οὔτε παντελῶς, [18] οὐδέ εἰ μὴ ποιήσαι· ἀν τούτῳ, ὡς ἤγογγε φημὶ δεῖν, εὐκαταφρονηθέν τινι—ἐν ’η διὰ τὸν φόβον εἰδὼς ευτρεπεῖς ύμᾶς (εἶσται γὰρ ἀκριβῶς· εἰσὶ γὰρ, εἰσίν οἱ πάντες ἐξαγγέλλοντες ἐκείνῳ παρ’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πλείους τοῦ δέοντος) ἤρχοισιν ἐχεῖ· ἡ παριδών ταῦτ’ αὐρακτος ληφθη, μηδὲνος ὑπ’ αὐτός ἐμποδών πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνου χώραν ύμῖν, ἂν ἐνδώ καὶ ὅσον. [19] ταύτα μὲν ἐστίν ἀ πάντῃ δεδοχθάν γημί δεῖν καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι προσήκειν ὑμᾶς πρὸς τούτων δύναμιν τιν’, ἡ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι, φημὶ προχειρίσασθαι δεῖν ύμᾶς, ἡ συνεχῶς πολεμήσει καὶ κακῶς ἐκείνος ποιήση. μὴ μοι μνήσως μηδὲ δισμούς Ξένους, μηδὲ τὰς ἐπιστολαμαίας ταύτας δύναμεις, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἔσται, κἀν ύμεῖς ἐνα κἀν πλείους καὶ τῶν δεινὰ καὶ ὁντινῶν χειροτόνησε στρατηγοῦν, τοῦτο ποιήσεται καὶ ἀκολουθήσει. [20] καὶ τροφήν ταύτῃ ποιήσαι κελεύω. ἔσται δ’ αὐτὴ τὶς ἡ δύναμις καὶ πόση, καὶ πόδεν τὴν τροφὴν ἐξεί, καὶ πᾶς ταῦτ’ ἔθελεσθε ποιεῖν· γὰρ φῶς, καθ’ ἐκαστὸν τούτων διεξόν χωρίς. Ξένους μὲν λέγω· καὶ ὅπως μὴ ποιήσσθ’ ὃ πολλάκις ὑμᾶς ἔβλαφεν· πάντ’ ἐλάττω νομίζοντες εἶναι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ τὰ μέγιστ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐν πρό τις ψηφίσμασιν αἰροῦμενοι,
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είτε τώ πράττετοι οὔδε τά μικρά ποιεῖτε; ἄλλα τά μικρά ποιήσαντες καὶ πορίσαντες τούτοις προσθίθετε, καὶ ἐλάττων φαινήτατο. [21] λέγω δῆ τοὺς πάντας στρατιῶτας δισχιλίους, τούτων δ’ Ἀθηναίους φημι δεῖν εἶναι πεντακοσίους, ἐξ ἣς ἀν τινὸς ὡς ἠλικίας καλῶς ἔχειν δοκῇ, χρόνον τακτῶν στρατευομένους, μὴ μακρὸν τούτων, ἀλλ’ ὅσον ἀν δοκῇ καλῶς ἔχειν, ἐκ διαδοχῆς ἀλλήλων· τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ἔξους εἶναι κελεύω. καὶ μετὰ τούτων ἵππαις διακοσίους, καὶ τούτων πεντίκοντ’ Ἀθηναίους τουλάχιστον, ἀστερὰς τοὺς πεζοὺς, τόν αὐτὸν τρόπον στρατευομένους· καὶ ἵππας γοιοῦς τούτοις. [22] εἰέν· τι πρὸς τούτοις ἐπὶ ταχείας τριήρεις ἄρα· δεί γὰρ, ἔχοντος ἕκεινον ναυτικόν, καὶ ταχείων τριήρων ἡμῖν, ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς ἢ δύναμις πλέον. πόθεν δὴ τούτως ἡ τροφή γενήσεται· ἔγω καὶ τοῦτο φράσοι καὶ δείξῃ, ἐπειδὰν, ὅπως τηλεκαταν ἀποχήν ὁμία τὴν δύναμιν καὶ πολίτας τοῖς στρατευομένοις εἶναι κελεύω, διδάξω. [23] τοσαίους μὲν ὡς ἄλλης Ἀθηναίοις, διὰ ταύτα, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνιὸν ἡμῖν πορίσασθαι δύναμιν τὴν ἑκείως παρατατομένην, ἄλλα ληστευέιν ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦτο τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦ πολέμου χρήσομαι τὴν πρώτην· οὐ τοῖς υπέροχοις αὐτών (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μισθὸς οὔδε τροφῆς), οὔδε παντελῶς ταπεινὴν εἶναι δεῖ. [24] πολίτας δὲ παρεῖπαι καὶ συμπλεῖν διὰ ταύτα κελεύω, ὅτι καὶ πρῶτον πτω ἀκούοις ἐξεικόνες τρέφοντες ἐν Κορίνθῳ τὴν πόλιν, οὐ Πολύστρατος ἦγετι καὶ Ἰφικράτης καὶ Χαβρίας καὶ ἄλλους τενέως, καὶ αὐτοῖς ύμᾶς συντρατεύομαι· καὶ οἴδαν αὐτών ὅτι Λακεδαιμονίως παρατατομένους μεθ᾽ ὡς ἔνικὼν ὤστε οἱ ξένοι καὶ ὑμεῖς μετ᾽ ἑκείνουν. ἐξ ὡς δ’ ἀυτὰ καθ’ ἄτα τὰ ἑξειδικά ύμῖν στρατεῦσαι, τοὺς ψίλους νικα καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ’ ἐχθροὶ μείζους του δέοντος it comes to performance, you fail to realize even the smallest. You should rather act and provide on a small scale, adding more if this proves insufficient. [21] So I propose that the whole force should consist of two thousand men, but of these five hundred must be Athenians, chosen from any suitable age and serving in relays for a specified period—not a long one, but just so long as seems advisable; the rest should be mercenaries. Attached to them will be two hundred cavalry, fifty at least of them being Athenians, serving on the same terms as the infantry. There will also be cavalry transports provided. [22] So far, so good; and what besides? Ten fast-sailing war-galleys. Since Philip has a fleet, we must have fast vessels if our force is to sail in safety. Now how is this army to be maintained? That also I will explain fully, when I have told you why I think so small a force sufficient, and why I insist that those serving shall be citizens. [23] I name a force of this size, Athenians, because it is not in our power now to provide one fit to meet him in pitched battle: we must adopt guerilla tactics to start with. The force must therefore be neither unwieldy—for we cannot afford the pay and maintenance—nor altogether insignificant. [24] My reasons for insisting on the presence of citizens in the expedition are these. I am told that on a previous occasion the state maintained a mercenary force at Corinth,4 commanded by Polystratus, Iphicrates, Chabrias, and others, and that you citizens also served in person; and I know from history that you and these mercenaries, fighting shoulder to shoulder, beat the Lacedaemonians in the field. But ever since exclusively mercenary forces have been fighting for you, it is your friends and allies that they have beaten, while the power of your enemies has increased beyond
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talents; for the ten fas

bound. They cast a casual glance at the war for which Athens has hired them, and off they sail to join Artabazus or anyone else, and the general naturally follows them, for he cannot command if he does not pay. [25] What then do I recommend? Deprive both general and men of all excuse by providing pay and by attaching to them citizen soldiers as overseers, so to speak, of their conduct in the field; for at present our system is a mockery. If anyone asked you, “Are you at peace, Athenians?” you would reply, “Certainly not; we are at war with Philip.” [26] But have you not been electing from among yourselves ten brigadiers and ten generals and ten squadron—leaders and a couple of cavalry-commanders? And what, pray, are those officers doing? With the exception of the solitary one whom you dispatch to the seat of war, they are all busy helping the state-sacrificers to marshal your processions. You are like the men who model the clay puppets; for the ten fast galleys forty talents, or twenty minae a ship
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πόλεις. Εάν μεν ήμεις, ὡς ἀνδρεὶς Αθηναίοι, δεδυνήμεθ ἐφθείνα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστιν· ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἐπιχειρήσατε ἡτοῖς ἱππεῖς ὑπάρχον, ἓν ὡς ἑξερήσατε τοὺς Χαλκεῖους καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Χώρας. Εἰ δὲ τάς τούτος ὑπάρχον τὸν τόπον ἐπερχόμεθα, καὶ ἑγὼ ἐπηρεάσθη ὑπὸ τῆς Ψυχομέλειας μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ ἐρωτήματι. Ἐπεξερεύνησαν τὴν περιοχὴν τῶν Λημνῶν καὶ Ζάκυνθου καὶ Λακωνίας ἐν τοῖς ὑπάρχοντι πλοῖοι καὶ ἐπηρεάσθη ὑπὸ αὐτὴν τῆς πολεμικῆς προοίμιας καὶ τῆς δισθείας τῶν ἑπτά νησίων ητοῖς ἄνθρωποι καὶ τῶν ἑπτά πολεμικῶν οἰκείων. Καὶ ἑκατοντάρχης ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεῖδη δὲ τοὺς Χαλκεῖους καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Χώρας ὑπάρχοντι τοῦτο ἐπηρεάσθη, ἕν ὡς ἑξερήσατε τοὺς Χαλκεῖους καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Χώρας. Εἰ δὲ τάς τούτος ὑπάρχον τὸν τόπον ἐπερχόμεθα, καὶ ἑγὼ ἐπηρεάσθη ὑπὸ τῆς Ψυχομέλειας μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ ἐρωτήματι. Ἐπηρεάσθη ἑκατοντάρχης ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεῖδη δὲ τοὺς Χαλκεῖους καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Χώρας ὑπάρχοντι τοῦτο ἐπηρεάσθη, ἕν ὡς ἑξερήσατε τοὺς Χαλκεῖους καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Χώρας. Εἰ δὲ τάς τούτος ὑπάρχον τὸν τόπον ἐπερχόμεθα, καὶ ἑγὼ ἐπηρεάσθη ὑπὸ τῆς Ψυχομέλειας μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ ἐρωτήματι. Ἐπηρεάσθη ἑκατοντάρχης ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεῖδη δὲ τοὺς Χαλκεῖους καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Χώρας ὑπάρχοντι τοῦτο ἐπηρεάσθη, ἕν ὡς ἑξερήσατε τοὺς Χαλκεῖους καὶ τοumont τούτος ὑπάρχον τὸν τόπον ἐπερχόμεθα, καὶ ἑγὼ ἐπηρεάσθη ὑπὸ τῆς Ψυχομέλειας μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ ἐρωτήματι. Ἐπηρεάσθη ἑκατοντάρχης ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεῖδη δὲ τοὺς Χαλκεῖους καὶ τοumont τούτος ὑπάρχον τὸν τόπον ἐπερχόμεθα, καὶ ἑγὼ ἐπηρεάσθη ὑπὸ τῆς Ψυχομέλειας μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τοῦ ἐρωτήματι. Ἐπηρεάσθη ἑκατοντάρχης ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεῖδη δὲ τοumont τούτος ὑπάρχον τὸν τόπον ἐπερχόμεθα, καὶ ἑγὼ ἐπηρεάσθη ὑπὸ τ Seventh of Athens, which my colleagues and I have been able to contrive. When you give your votes, you will pass these proposals, if you approve them, because your object is to fight Philip not only with decrees and dispatches, but with deeds also.

[31] But you would, I think, men of Athens, form a better idea of the war and of the total force required, if you considered the geography of the country you are attacking, and if you reflected that the winds and the seasons enable Philip to gain most of his successes by forestalling us. He waitst for the Etesian winds or for the winter, and attacks at a time when we could not possibly reach the seat of war. [32] Bearing this in mind, we must rely not on occasional levies, or we shall be too late for everything, but on a regular standing army. You have the advantage of winter bases for your troops in Lemnos, Thasos, Scia罗斯, and the neighboring islands, where are to be found harbors, provisions, and everything that an army needs; and during that
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πρός τή γη γενέσθαι ώδειν και τό τῶν πνευμάτων ἁγιαλές, πρός αὐτή τή χώρα και πρός τοὺς τῶν ἐμπορίων στόμαιν τράδιας ἐσταῖ. [33] ἢ μὲν οὖν χρήσται καὶ πότε τῇ δυνάμει, παρὰ τὸν καρφόν ὁ τούτων κύριος καταστάς ὑπ’ ὑμᾶς βουλευτεῖται ἀ δ’ ὑπάρξαι δεὶ παρ’ ὑμῶν, ταῦτ’ ἐστιν ἀγὼ γέγραφα, ἀν ταῦτ’, ὡς ἄνδρες Αθηναίοι, πορίσθητε, τα χρήματα πρῶτον ἢ λέγω, εἴτε καὶ τάλα παρασκευάσαντες, τοὺς στρατιώτας, τὰς τριήρεις, τοὺς ἵππας, ἐνετή πάσαν τὴν δύναμιν νῦμο κατακλείσῃ ἕπι τῷ πολέμῳ μένειν, τῶν μὲν χρημάτων αὐτοῦ ταμίαι καὶ πορίσται γιγνόμενοι, τῶν δὲ πράξεων παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τόν λόγον ζητοῦντες, παύσεσθ’ αἰε περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν βουλευόμενοι καὶ πλέον οὐδέν ποιοῦντες, [34] καὶ ἐτι πρὸς τούτῳ πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς ἄνδρες Αθηναίοι, τὸν μέγιστον τῶν εἰκείνου πόρου αἰφαφιεσθε. ἐστί δ’ ὁ σύ τοι τοῖς ἑαυτοῖς ὑπ’ ὑμῶν πολεμεῖ συμμάχως, ἅγιοι καὶ φέροντοι τοὺς πλέοντας τὴν θάλατταν. ἔπειτα τί πρὸς τούτῳ τοῦ πάσχαι αὐτοῦ κακῶς ἔξω γενήσεσθε, οὐχ ὡσπερ τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον εἰς Λήμνον καὶ Ἱμβρόν ἐμβαλὼν αἰχμαλώτους πολίτας υμετέρους ὑπερ’ ἔχουν, πρός τὸ Γερασῖτα μας πλοίαν συλλαβῶν ἀμύθητα χρήματ’ ἐξέλεξε, τὰ τελευταῖ’ εἰς Μαραθῶν’ ἀπέβη καὶ τὴν ἱερὰν ἀντί τῆς χώρας ὑπερ’ ἔχον τρίηρη, ὑμεῖς δ’ οὔτε ταῦτα δύνασθε καλύειν οὔτ’ εἰς τοὺς χρόνους, οὔτ’ ἀν προθήκην, ὑπερθέειν. [35] καὶ τὶ δήποτ’, ὡς ἄνδρες Αθηναίοι, νομίζετε τὴν μὲν τῶν Παναθηναίων ἔστην καὶ τὴν τῶν Διονυσίων αἰε τοῦ καθήκοντος χρόνου γίγνεσθαι, ἂν τε δεῖνοι λάχασιν ἂν τ’ ἰδίωτα οἱ τούτων ἐκατέρων ἐπιμελούμενοι, εἰς ἀ τοιαῦτ’ ἀναλίσκεται χρήματα, δό’ οὔτ’ εἰς ἕνα τῶν ἁποστόλων, καὶ τοσοῦτον ὄχλοι καὶ παρασκευήν season of the year when it is easy to stand close in to shore and the winds are steady, your force will easily lie off his coast and at the mouth of his seaports. [33] How and when this force is to be employed will be a matter for your duly appointed commander to determine according to circumstances, but what it is your task to provide, that I have put down in my resolution. If, men of Athens, you first provide the funds which I name and then equip the whole force complete, men, ships and cavalry, binding them legally to serve for the duration of the war, and if you make yourselves the stewards and administrators of the funds, looking to your general for an account of his operations, then you will no longer be for ever debating the same question and never making any progress. [34] More than that, Athenians, you will be depriving Philip of his principal source of revenue. And what is that? For the war against you he makes your allies pay by raiding their sea-borne commerce. Is there any further advantage? Yes, you will be out of reach of injury yourselves. Your past experience will not be repeated, when he threw a force into Lemnos and Imbros and carried your citizens away captive, when he seized the shipping at Geraestus and levied untold sums, or, to crown all, when he landed at Marathon and bore away from our land the sacred trireme,11 while you are still powerless to prevent these insults or to send your expeditions at the appointed times. [35] And yet, men of Athens, how do you account for the fact that the Panathenaic festival and the Dionysia are always held at the right date, whether experts or laymen are chosen by lot to manage them, that larger sums are lavished upon them than upon any one of your expeditions, that they are celebrated with bigger crowds and greater splendor than
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όσην οὕκ οὐδ’ εἰ τί τῶν ἀπάντων ἔχει, τοὺς δ’ ἀποστόλους πάντας ὑμῖν ὑστερίζειν τῶν καρίων, τόν εἰς Μεθώνην, τόν εἰς Παγασάς, τόν εἰς Ποτίδαιαν; [36] ὅτι ἐκείνα μὲν ἀπάντα νόμῳ τέτακτα, καὶ πρόοιδεν ἐκαστὸς ὑμῶν ἐκ πολλοῦ τις χορήγης ἢ γυμνασίαρχος τῆς φυλῆς, πότε καὶ παρὰ τοῦ καὶ τι λαβόντα τί δει ποιεῖν, οὐδὲν ἀνεξάντατον οὐδ’ ὁμοίων ἐν τούτωι ἡμέληται: ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῇ τούτων παρασκευῇ ἄπαντα, ἀδύρθωτα, ἀόρισθ’ ἀπάντα, τοιχαράντων ἀμ’ ἀληθεμέναν τι καὶ τριφάρξοις καθιστάμεν καὶ τούτως ἀντίδοσεις ποιούμεθα καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πόρου σκοποῦμεν, καὶ μετά τὰ ἐμβαίνειν τοὺς μετοίκους ἐδοξε καὶ τοὺς χωρίς ὀκούντας, [37] εἰτ’ αὐτοῦς πάλιν, εἰτ’ ἀντιμβάζειν, εἰτ’ ἐν ὅσῳ ταύτα μέλλεται, προσαπόλωλεν τὸ ἑρ’ ὃ ἀν ἐκπλήκτηκεν· τὸν γὰρ τὸ πρότειν χρόνον εἰς τὸ παρασκευαζόμενον ἀναλίσκομεν, οἱ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ μένουσι καροῖ τὴν ἡμέτέραν βραδυτήτα καὶ εἰρωνείαν. ὡς δὲ τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνων δυνάμεως οἰσμέθ’ ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν οἰαὶ τ’ οὕτως ποιεῖν εἰτ’ αὐτῶν τῶν καρίων ἐξελέγχονται, ὃ δ’ εἰς τοῦτο ᾑδέως ἠληθεύθεν ἢτο ἐπιστέλλειν Εὐβοἶοι ἡμῖν ἐκστάτη δικαίως εὐθύναιν ἢτοι πολλὰς ἔδη τῆς ἐπανάκτης ἀναλήψεως.

“Επιστολής Ανάγνωσις”

[38] τούτων, ὥς ἀνδρεὺς Αθηναίοι, τῶν ἀνεγνωσμένων ἄλληθ’ μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ πολλά, ὡς οὐκ ἐδέχετε, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἵσαν συχ ἢδ’ αἰκούνες. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν, δι’ ἄν τις ὑπερβηθ’ τῷ λόγῳ, ἴνα μὴ λυπήσῃ, καὶ τὰ πράγματ’ ὑπερβηθήντα, δει πρὸς ἡδονὴν δημιουργεῖν· εἰ δ’ ἢ τῶν λόγων χαῖρ, ἢ μὴ προσήκουσα, ἐργά ζημία γίγνεται, αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ φενακίζειν ἕαυτους, καὶ ἀπαντ’ ἀναβαλλόμενος ἢν ἢ δυσχερὴ πάντων ὑστερίζειν τῶν ἔργων, [39] καὶ μηδε τούτῳ anything else of the kind in the world, whereas your expeditions invariably arrive too late, whether at Methone or at Pagasaes or at Potidaea? [36] The explanation is that at the festivals everything is ordered by statute; every man among you knows long beforehand who of his tribe is to provide the chorus or who to equip the gymnasium,12 what he is to receive, when and from whom he is to receive it, and what he is to do; nothing here is left to chance, nothing is undetermined: but in what pertains to war and its equipment, everything is ill-arranged, ill-managed, ill-defined. Consequently we wait till we have heard some piece of news, and then we appoint our ship-masters, and arrange suits for exchange of property,13 and go into committee of ways and means, and next we resolve that the fleet shall be manned by resident aliens and freedmen, [37] then again by citizens, then by substitutes, then, while we thus delay, the object of our cruise is already lost. Thus the time for action is wasted in preparation, but the opportunities of fortune wait not for our dilatoriness and reluctance. The forces which we fancied would serve us as a stop-gap incapable when the crucial moment arrives. Meanwhile Philip has the effrontery to send such letters as these to the Euboceans.

“Reading of the Letter”

[38] Most of what has been read, Athenians, is unfortunately true—possibly, however, not pleasant to listen to. But if all that a speaker passes over, to avoid giving offence, is passed over by the course of events also, then blandiloquence is justified; but if smooth words out of season prove a curse in practice, then it is our disgrace if we hoodwink ourselves, if we shelve whatever is irksome and so miss the
Debeosethenes, Kata Filippoua'

dúnasthai mathein, óti de tois orhísw polémw chrwménnous ouk ákolouthen tois prágmatw, all' autws émpreswthen einai tôn prágmatow, kai toj auton trópon woste twn stratevumátow áxiwsei tis tôn prastagwn hegeíthai, ouç kai tôn prágmatow tois boulvevménois, i'n' än ékeiwous dokh, tauta práptetai kai mi tâ symbánta' anagkaíontai diákein. [40] ùmeis ð', ò adóres Athnáioi, pléioste dúnamín ápántan ékountes, truphèes, óplitas, íptées, chrwmátow prósoodoiv, toutów méxh tis tìmevnon ëmerous ouvèn piwot' eis deon ti kheëròse, ouvèn ð' apoleípete, woste ói básoi piwteúoun, ouvèn polýmeiv Filíptow. Kai gar ékeiwous ð plígeis ðei tis plíges ëketai, kai étérraseis pataxh ti, ékeis' eisiv a' xheìres' probsállexeis ð' õ blèpeiv énαntion ou't ouvèn ou't õthle. [41] kai ùmeis, eñ en Xerxhónas pwthíse Filíptow, ékeixe botheivn phrijìseth, eñ en Pílaseis, ékeixe, en állovi pou, symparakainet' anw kátov, kai strateyghēt' õpt' ékeiwous, bpeoilvuseth ð' ouvèn autwv suvpheron peri tou polémou, ouvèn proj tois pragramatow proorat' ouvèn, prin ãn ÷i geganemewn õ geganemwv tì pwthíse. táuta ð' iòsws próteron mé̲n õn pav' õv' õi a'thtan õkheiv tîn akìmhn, õsot' oukêi' èghxoréi. [42] dòkei ð' õs toîa thevain, ò adóres Athnáioi, tois geganemwv õpt' tîs poléwos aiçhvnwmewn õ filospagmoxusin tawtèn õmbaleiv Filíptow. õi gàs õhovn õ kateòsthraptai kai profeílwvnh õhuxiän õcæwv õhlevei kai miðev êpparatet õti, õpoxhèn õnios õmowv an õ mið evæi, õs õn aïçhvnn õn anánvdiwv kai pánta tò aïçhvwn õfylkátov õn õmewn dhmowv. n' ð' épixewmw õei tîn kai tî poléwos õghenwmewn õiòsw õn õkkaλèswaðh õmawv, eîper mi pántaptasv apegvákaite. [43] õvamózw ð' ègawh, eî miðeis õmowv mi't time for action, [39] if we fail to learn the lesson that to manage a war properly you must not follow the trend of events but must forestall them, and that just as an army looks to its general for guidance, so statesmen must guide circumstances, if they are to carry out their policy and not be forced to follow at the heels of chance. [40] But you, Athenians, possessing unsurpassed resources—fleet, infantry, cavalry, revenues—have never to this very day employed them aright, and yet you carry on war with Philip exactly as a barbarian boxes. The barbarian, when struck, always clutches the place; hit him on the other side and there go his hands. He neither knows nor cares how to parry a blow or how to watch his adversary. [41] So you, if you hear of Philip in the Chersonese, vote an expedition there; if at Thermopylae, you vote one there; if somewhere else, you still keep pace with him to and fro. You take your marching orders from him; you have never framed any plan of campaign for yourselves, never foreseen any event, until you learn that something has happened or is happening. All this was once perhaps possible; now things have come to a crisis, so that it is no longer in your power. [42] It seems to me, Athenians, as if some god, out of very shame for the conduct of our city, had inspired Philip with this activity. For if he did nothing more, but were willing to rest satisfied with what he has already captured and subdued, I believe some of you would be quite content with what must bring the deepest disgrace upon us and brand us as a nation of cowards. But by always attempting something new, always seeking at more power, he may possibly rouse even you, if you have not utterly abandoned hope. [43] Personally I am surprised that none of
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ἐνθυμείται μήτ’ οργίζεται, όροιν, ὥ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου γεγενημένην περὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι Φιλίππου, τὴν δὲ τελευτὴν οὖσαν ἢδε υπὲρ τοῦ μή παθεῖν κακῶς ὑπὸ Φιλίππου. ἀλλὰ μήν ὅτι γ’ οὐ στήσεται, δὴλον, εἰ μὴ τις κωλύσει, εἰτα τοῦτ’ ἀναμενούμεν; καὶ τρίφρης κενὰς καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῦ δεινοῦ ἐλπίδας ἀν ἀποστείλῃ, πάντ’ ἔχειν οἰεοθε καλῶς; [44] οὐκ ἐμβηθούμεθα; οὐκ ἔξειμον αὐτοὶ μέρει γ’ τινί στρατιωτῶν ὦκειών νῦν, εἰ καὶ μή πρότερον; οὐκ ἐτι τὴν ἐκείνον πλευσόμεθα; ποὶ οὐν προσομοιοῦμεθ’; ἡρετὸς τὶς. εὐφησεὶ τὰ σαθρά, ὥ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, τῶν ἐκείνου πραγμάτων αὐτοῦ ὁ πόλεμος. ἂν ἐπιχειρῶμεν. ἂν μὲντοι καθόμεθ’ ὦκοι, λοιδορομένων ἀκούοντες καὶ αἰτιωμένων ἀλλήλους τῶν λεγόντων, οὐδὲπ’ οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μὴ γένηται τῶν δεόντων. [45] ὅποι μὲν γὰρ ἃν, οἴμαι, μέρος τὶς πόλεως συναποσταλῆ; κἂν μὴ πᾶσα, καὶ τὸ τῶν θεῶν εὐμενὲς καὶ τὸ τῆς τύχης συναγωνίζεται; ὅποι δ’ ἂν στρατηγὸς καὶ ψήφισμα κενὸν καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἐλπίδας ἐκπέμψητε, οὐδὲν ὡς τῶν δεόντων γίγνεται, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἑχθοὶ καταγελῶσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι τεθνάοι τῷ δόεις τοὺς τιτουσῶς ἀποστόλους. [46] οὐ γὰρ ἑστίν, οὐκ ἑστίν ἐν’ ἄνδρα ὄντηκαν ποτὲ ταῦθ’ ὑμῖν πράξει πάντ’ ὡσα βουλεύοντες. ὑποσχέσθαι μέντοι καὶ φήμα καὶ τὸν δεῖν αἰτιῶσασθαι καὶ τὸν δεῖν ἑστι τὰ δεῖγμα έκ τοῦτοι ἀπολαλεγέν τὸν γὰρ ἠγάθη τὸν στρατηγὸς ἀθλίων ἀπομισθὼν ἔξεσιν, οἱ δ ’ ὑπὲρ ὃν ἂν εἰκοσὶ πράξῆ πρὸς ὦμα ζευγναμοί ἀδίκως ενδιάδ’ ὠσιν, ὑμεῖς δ’ εἴ ὃν ἂν αἰκοσθή’ ὃ τι ἂν τύχη πηρίζεθα, τὶ καὶ χρῆ προσδοκᾶν; [47] πῶς οὖν τάντα παύσεται; ὅταν ὑμεῖς, ὥ ἄνδρες Αθηναῖοι, τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀποδείξετε στρατιώτας καὶ μάρτυρας τῶν στρατηγουμένων καὶ δικαστὰς

you, Athenians, is distressed and angry to find that at the beginning of

the war our aim was to punish Philip, but at the end it is to escape

injury at his hands. But surely it is obvious that he will not stop,

unless someone stops him. And is that what we are to wait for? Do

you fancy that all is well, if you dispatch an unmanned fleet and the

vague hope of some deliverer? [44] Shall we not man the fleet

ourselves? Shall we not take the field with at least a proportion of

native troops, even now, if never before? Shall we not sail against his

territory? “Where then are we to go and anchor?” someone has asked.

The progress of the war, men of Athens, will itself discover the weak

places in his front, if we make the effort; but if we sit here at home

listening to the abuse and mutual recriminations of the orators, there

is not the slightest chance of our getting anything done that ought to

be done. [45] Wherever, I believe, we send out a force composed

partly or wholly of our citizens; there the gods are gracious and

fortune fights on our side; but wherever you send out a general with

an empty decree and the mere aspirations of this platform, your needs

are not served, your enemies laugh you to scorn, your allies stand in

mortal fear of such an expeditionary force. [46] It is impossible, utterly

impossible for one man ever to do all that you want done; he can only

promise14 and assent and throw the blame on someone else. In

consequence our interests are ruined. For when your general leads

wretched, ill-paid mercenaries, and finds plenty of men here to lie to

you about what he has done, while you pass decrees at random on the

strength of these reports, what are you to expect? [47] How then is all

this to be stopped? As soon as you, men of Athens, definitely appoint

the same men as soldiers and as eye-witnesses of the campaign, and,
οίκαδ' ἐλθόντας τῶν εὐθυνῶν, ὡστε µὴ ἀκοῦειν µόνον ὡµᾶς τὰ ύµέτερ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρόντας ὁράν. τὸν δὲ εἰς τοῦτὸ ἱκεῖ τὰ πράγµατ' αἰσχύνης ὡστε τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐκάστος δίς καὶ τρῖς κρίνεται παρ' ὑµῖν περὶ θανάτου, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἀπαὶ αὐτῶν ἁγιοσάσθαι περὶ θανάτου τολµά, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ἀνδραποδιστῶν καὶ λαπιστῶν θάνατον µᾶλλον αἰροῦνται τὸν προσήκοντος· κακούργον µὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ κρίθεν' ἀποθανεῖν, στρατηγὸν δὲ µαχόμενον τοῖς πολεµίωσι. [48] ἡµῶν δὲ οἱ µὲν περιώντες µετὰ Λακεδαιµονίων φασὶ Φιλίππον πράττειν τὴν Θηβαίων κατάλυσιν καὶ τὰς πολιτείας διαστάν, οἱ δ' ὡς πρέσβεις πέποµφεν ὡς βασιλεά, οἱ δ' ἐν Ἰλλυρίωις πόλεις τείχεσαν, οἱ δὲ λόγους πλάττοντες ἐκάστος περιεχόµεθα. [49] ἐγὼ δ' ὀίµαι µέν, ὃς ἀνδρεῖς Αθηναίοι, ὁ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐκεῖνον µεθεῖν τὸ µεγέθει τῶν πεταραγµένων καὶ πολλὰ τοιαύτα ὑπεροπτολεῖν ἐν τῇ γνώµῃ, τὴν τ' ἐρµìαν τῶν κωλυσθὼν ὁµών καὶ τοῖς πεταραγµένοις ἐτηροµένον, ὥς µὲντοι µὰ Δι' οὕτω γε προαιρεῖσθαι πράττειν ὡστε τοὺς ανοιχτόταις τῶν παρ' ὑµῖν εἰδέναι τι µέλλει ποιεῖν ἕκεινος· ανοιχτόται γὰρ εἰσίν οἱ λογοποιοῦντες. [50] ἀλλ' ἐγὼ δ' ἐστιν εἰδέµεν, ὅτι ἐχθρὸς ἀνθρωπος καὶ τὰ ύµέτερ' ἡµᾶς ἀποστερεῖ καὶ ὁ χρόνον πολύν ὑπεµική, καὶ ἀπανθ.' ὡς πᾶσιν ὁ δὴ πρέσβεις ἀνθρωποὺς µικρὸν πάντα εἴδοσαµεν τινα πράξειν υπέρ ἡµῶν καθ' ἡµῶν εὑρήτα, καὶ τὰ ἴσητα ἐν αὐτῶς ἡµῖν εστί, κἂν µὴ γὰρ ὑπελαµοῦσαν εἰκε πολεµεῖν αὐτῷ, ἐνδεικνύοµεν ἀναγκασθήσασθαι τῶν τοιούτων ποιεῖν, ἀν τούτ.' εἰδοµένε, καὶ τὰ δέοντ' ἐσοµεθ' ἐγκοκτονεῖ καὶ λογοθ' ματαιών ἀσπλαγµένοις· γὰρ ἡ ἡµῖν τοῦτο ποτ' ἐστιν τοις σκοποῖς, ἀλλ' ἕτερον φαύλα, ἐν µὴ προσέχετε τοὺς νοῦς καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα ποιεῖν ἐθέλητε, εὗ εἰδεναι. [51] ἐγὼ µὲν οὖν οὔτ' ἄλλοτε πάστε πρὸς on their return, as jurymen at the audit of your generals. In this way you will not merely learn about your affairs by hearsay, but you will be witnesses on the spot. So scandalous is our present system that every general is tried two or three times for his life in your courts, but not one of them dares to risk death in battle against the enemy; no, not once. They prefer the doom of a kidnapper or a pickpocket to a fitting death; for malefactors are condemned to the gallows, generals should die on the field of honor. [48] Some of us spread the rumor that Philip is negotiating with the Lacedaemonians for the overthrow of Thebes and the dissolution of the free states, others that he has sent an embassy to the Great King, others that he is besieging towns in Illyria; in short, each of us circulates his own piece of fiction. [49] Truly, men of Athens, I do think that Philip is drunk with the magnitude of his achievements and dreams of further triumphs, when, elated by his success, he finds there that he is not mere bar to his way; but I cannot for a moment believe that he is deliberately acting in such a way that all the fools at Athens know what he is going to do next. For of all fools the rumor-mongers are the worst. [50] But if, putting rumors aside, we recognize that this man is our enemy, who has for years been robbing and insulting us, that wherever we once hoped to find help we have found hindrance, in our own hands, and if we refuse to fight now in Thrace, we shall perhaps be forced to fight here at home—if, I say, we recognize these facts, then we shall have done with idle words and shall come to a right decision. Our business is not to speculate on what the future may bring forth, but to be certain that it will bring disaster, unless you face the facts and consent to do your duty. [51] For my own part, I have never yet chosen to court your
δήμοσθενής, κατά φιλιππού ά' 

χάριν εἰλόμην λέγειν ὅ τι ἂν μῆ καὶ συνοίσειν πεπεισμένος ὦ, νῦν θ’ ἄ γιγνόσια πάνθ’ ἀπλῶς, οὐδὲν ὑποστειλάμενος, πεπαρρησίασαμαι ἐβουλόμην δ’ ἂν, ὡσπερ ὅτι ύμῖν συμφέρει τὰ βέλτιστ’ ἀκούειν οἶδα, ὡσεὶς εἰδέναι συνοίσεσαν καὶ τῷ τὰ βέλτιστ’ εἰπόντι πολλῷ γὰρ ἂν ἦδιον εἴχον. νῦν δ’ ἔπ’ ἄδήλοις οὐκο τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦτων ἐμαυτῷ γεννησμένοις, ὅμως ἐπὶ τῷ συνοίσειν ύμῖν, ἂν πράξῃτε, ταῦτα πεπείσθαι λέγειν αἰροῦμαι. νικώ δ’ ὃ τι πάσιν μέλλει συνοίσειν.

favor by saying anything that I was not quite convinced would be to your advantage; and today, keeping nothing back, I have given free utterance to my plain sentiments. Yet, certain as I am that it is to your interest to receive the best advice, I could have wished that I were equally certain that to offer such advice is also to the interest of the speaker; for then I should have felt much happier. But, as it is, in the uncertainty of what the result of my proposal may be for myself, yet in the conviction that it will be to your interest to adopt it, I have ventured to address you. Whatever shall be to the advantage of all, may that prevail!

1 The reference is probably to the invasion of Boeotia by Agesilaus in 378.
2 Lit. “being cut off [from Amphipolis] both in forces and in plans,” a vigorous but untranslatable phrase.
3 The Athenians sent a force to Euboea in 357 (cf. Dem. 1.8). They helped the Thebans to defeat Lysander at Haliartus in Boeotia in 395. In 352, when Philip tried to march from Thessaly against Phoci, he was checked by the dispatch of an Athenian fleet to Thermopylae.
4 During the so-called “Corinthian War,” 394—387, when Iphicrates with a light-armed force destroyed a mora of Spartan hoplites. Chabrias, his successor, is best known for his defeat of the Lacedaemonian fleet at Naxos in 376. Of Polystratus, little or nothing is known.
5 Just as the terra-cotta figurines were manufactured not for practical use, but for the toy-market, so the generals were elected, not to fight, but to make a brave show in the public processions.
6 We learn from Aristot. Ath. Pol. 61.6, that a ἵππαρχος was regularly sent to Lemnos to take charge of the cavalry there.
7 Identified by Harpocratus with a son of Amyntas II and so half-brother of Philip; more probably a petty Macedonian chief who helped the Athenians at Potidaea in 364, and who is named in a complimentary inscription which has been preserved (C.I.A. 2.55).
8 The proposed pay is 2 obols a day for infantry and marines, 1 drachma for cavalry. The crew of a trireme numbered 200. The daily pay would therefore be: Galleys: 2 ob. x 200 x 10 = 4000 ob. Infantry: 2 ob. x 2000 = 4000 ob. Cavalry: 6 ob. x 200 = 1200 ob. Total, 9200 obols or 15 1/3 minae a day; 460 minae or 7 2/3 talents a month; 92 talents a year. The hoplite normally received 2 obols for pay and the same for rations; the cavalry thrice this amount. Demosthenes’ proposal amounts to this, that the pay should be halved and the men encouraged to make it up by looting. To appreciate these sums, it should be noted that an unskilled laborer at Athens received 3 or 4 obols a day.

9 On some financial board, or perhaps only members of the same political party. The suggestion of Dionysius that a new speech commences here has not found favor with the majority of editors.

10 Northerly winds which blew steadily down the Aegean in the autumn.

11 The “Paralus,” conveying the θεωρία or state-embassy to Delos in May, touched at Marathon to offer sacrifice in the Δήλιον or sanctuary of Apollo. Readers of the Phaedo will remember why the execution of Socrates was postponed for thirty days.

12 A more important function of the gymnasiarch was to equip a team for the torch-race (λαμπαδηφορία).

13 If a citizen, nominated for a “liturgy,” thought that a richer member of his tribe, otherwise eligible, had been passed over, he could challenge him to undertake the burden or exchange properties. In the case of the trierarchy such a challenge was referred to the Strategi.

14 Editors detect a special allusion here. The “promises of Chares” had become proverbial.